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ABSTRACT- ER$"g^SCHOOl
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued a Program Budget Decision
(PBD) requesting a study of supply material availability (SMA) and related issues for
Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs).
PBD-405 shows a disparity between percentage levels of supply support for the
NADEPs and the current overall fill rates published by the Navy Inventory Control Point-
Philadelphia (NAVICP-P) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This thesis
evaluates the effectiveness of SMA and determines if SMA is a valuable measurement
tool for NADEPs, determines if supply support has an impact on production, and
determines if NADEPs are receiving poor supply support. This thesis evaluates the Air
Force and United Airline Services (UAS) depot support to determine any common trends
or ways to improve NADEP support. After conducting procedure and policy reviews,
interviews and site visits to NADEP North Island, ALC Hill, UAS San Francisco and
Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR), this research concludes that SMA, in its
current formulation, is not effective as a measurement tool to indicate supply
effectiveness in terms of operational readiness. Also, this research has determined that
there is a major link between poor material support and production cycle time. The study
recommends the government review post production support plans, pursue
standardization, review contract specialist and item manager staffing, and identify and
analyze readiness measurement tools.
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In this study we evaluate the current supply support of aviation depots and
address questions concerning Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) supply support, the
effectiveness of SMA (system material availability) as a measurement tool, and the
impact of supply support on production as outlined in Program Budget Decision (PBD)
405. A Program Budget Decision is a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) decision
authorizing changes to a submitted budget. [Ref. 4:p. 233] This particular PBD was a
result of a request by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to increase the budget
for NADEPs due to a civilian pay increase and increased customer orders. This document
approves this requested adjustment and requests the Navy to study NADEP supply
support. Our research is focused to the needs of the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) and the Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia (NAVICP-P). Those
unfamiliar with NADEP organizations will find clarifying details in chapter three.
PBD-405 shows that the (SMA) fill rates of NADEPS (Cherry Point,
Jacksonville, North Island) are much less than fleet averages. These fill rates are
generated by NAVICP and reflect NAVICP's and DLA's ability to fill requisitions on the
first pass. Specific details on SMA will follow in chapter two. NAVICP maintains these
statistics, for they own the aviation components that the NADEP 's repair. As item
manager and owner of the material, NAVICP-Philadelphia is responsible for forecasting
induction requirements and providing that information to the NADEP for scheduling and
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resource planning. DLA is an intricate support organization as well. DLA owns and
manages the wholesale stock that NADEP North Island uses to repair components and
maintain warehouses and distribution centers throughout the continental United States.
Material that is required to repair a component is requisitioned from DLA, who is
responsible for managing those items and filling customer orders. The tool measuring this
filling of customer orders is SMA, and it is defined as the percent of requisitions, which
are satisfied/filled on the first pass against system assets. SMA for NADEPs fall well
below the 85% NAVICP-P published fill rates for the Navy.
All Cherry Point Jacksonville North Island
Oct 98 70 69 73 68
Nov 98 68 76 71 51
Dec 98 70 74 73 59
Jan 99 75 69 82 71
Feb 99 69 74 69 63
Mar 99 70 65 78 61
Apr 99 70 65 70 75
May 99 73 70 72 78
Jun99 73 70 74 75
Jul 99 74 70 74 78
Aug 99 68 61 71 73
Sep 99 69 77 68 60
Table 1. FY 99 SMA percentages for NADEPs [From PBD-405].
NADEP SMA LEVELS
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Figure 1
.
FY 99 SMA graphical comparisons. Note: The line at 85% depicts the
Navy published goal for SMA.
Considering the current military environment of diminishing funds and a
management focus on best business practices, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and higher echelon leadership have targeted selected organizations for potential
improvements in inefficiency and or ineffectiveness. They are using a core competency
philosophy to determine what the organization does well and what might be outsourced.
This effort identified the disparity in depot SMA compared to fleet SMA. This caused
OSD to question both the effectiveness of (SMA) in measuring supply support for
NADEP production and whether the current supply system contributes to long turn
around times in NADEP production. Additionally, OSD would like recommendations for
improving both of these areas of concern.
There are many underlying variables contributing to supply support effectiveness,
including forecasting, scheduling, and aging aircraft. Forecasting and scheduling
effectiveness and efficiency directly affect the certainty of requirements. Any error in
these areas can directly cause a rippling affect promulgating a significant time lag in
obtaining resources. An aged aircraft system can severely impact support effectiveness
through compounded uncertainty and lack of suppliers. This causes excessive delays in
rum around time. In this thesis, we observed the variables, studied depot supply support
procedures, assessed the effectiveness of SMA as a measurement tool, compared Air
Force and United Airlines Services (UAS) and recommended courses of action.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our research addresses the following research questions:
• What are the components ofSMA?
• Is SMA a good indicator of NADEP supply support?
• Is NADEPs' production impacted by the "poor supply support", as stated
in PBD-405?
• What other tools might measure NADEP supply support?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Each Depot Organization is extremely dynamic and complex; for example,
NADEP North Island manages Planned Depot Maintenance (PDM) for the F-18, E-2, S-
3, C-2, H-60 and their respective components as well as those of other aviation platforms.
A comprehensive study of the range of production and supply support analysis is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Our thesis will focus on a sample PDM platform for each depot
system (Navy, Air Force, and UAS) that best employs all the facets of the current supply
system in each organization.
The Navy Aviation Depot system consists of three major facilities; NADEP
Jacksonville, FL; NADEP Cherry Point, NC; and NADEP North Island, CA. In this
thesis, we will analyze SMA at NADEP North Island, because of its unique and
interlocking partnership with the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego.
We selected the F/A-18 platform as our PDM sample for NADEPs because it
engaged the most supply support functions, allowing a whole supply system observation.
Incidental to studying the backorders for the E-2, C-2 and S-3, we discovered these
platforms did not use all facets of the supply system and were experiencing excessive
turn around times (TAT); 67, 150, and 210 days respectively. Our studies indicated the
primary cause for long TATs was extensive delays in part arrival time. This is a direct
result of aging aircraft systems.
We found that each of these platforms has been out of production for an average
of 15 years and its service life has been extended beyond initial expectations. As a result,
a significant number of aircraft component suppliers are no longer producing components
for these aging systems. The lengthy time waiting for parts is primarily due to long lead-
time for procurement contracts. We observed weaknesses in the Post Production Support
Plan (PPSP) and highly recommend an in-depth review of PPSP for all aging systems, as
well as scrutiny of PPSP in current systems. Although a significant and common cause of
aging aircraft issues are supply delays in all of the depot systems we observed, they are
issues of mismatching input resources and output requirements and a diminishing
Defense Industrial Base. These issues require immediate attention for the health of Naval
Aviation and higher level of analysis is beyond our scope.
The Air Force Aviation Depot System consists of three Aircraft Logistics Centers
(ALC); Hill ALC, Ogden, UT; Warner Robins, ALC, Warner Robins, GA; Tinker ALC,
Oklahoma City, OK. Our thesis analyzes Hill ALC, as the Air Force sample because of
its experience conducting depot maintenance on the F-18 program during the period July
1993 to December 1995 and its experience conducting PDM on both Navy and Air Force
C-130s.
After examining each production line at ALC Hill (A- 10, C-130, F-16), we
selected the C-130 as the PDM platform to compare to the NADEP system. The other
PDM system (A- 10) did not engage enough supply system functions because it is
experiencing the same aging aircraft implications as the E-2, C-2, and S-3 platforms from
NADEP, North Island.
Our commercial example, United Airlines Services (UAS), has three maintenance
facilities: San Francisco, Oakland and Indianapolis. We have selected UAS, San
Francisco, CA because of its throughput and proximity. It serves B-700, A- 319, and A-
320 series aircraft, plus five engine types. While, UAS San Francisco is no longer an in-
depth maintenance facility, C-checks and major engine work are performed in the San
Francisco plant. The data provided was very useful as a reference point for the
commercial industry. UAS also experienced aging aircraft difficulties, and resolved them
initially by purchasing used whole aircraft for parts. Subsequently, they found more value
in replacing the aged systems with newer systems.
One of the constraints aside from those mentioned is the military funding process
that fixes labor and overhead rates two years in advance of the work performed. This
process is called the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and can only
be changed by law. As a result, change recommendations concerning this system are
beyond the scope of this research. The funding system can significantly impact the ability
to schedule jobs and order parts, which creates uncertainty and increases supply lead
times. The two military aviation depots are both Working Capital Funds (WCF) relying
on reimbursement through customer appropriated operations and maintenance funds.
Government budgeting uses expected expenditures several years ahead of schedule,
which introduces a funding-timing problem that significantly affects supply support. The
projected requirements at the time of the budget submission can significantly change by
the time of budget execution. Labor rates and fixed overhead rates can increase in this
time frame, due to pay raises as in PBD-405 and increased costs; however the military
depots are required to use the fixed rates. This creates a shortage of available funding for
labor and parts, causing a mismatch of needs and resources. Unanticipated workload can
also cause a mismatch ofneeds and resources.
For example, in two years a trend in component failure may surface that requires
immediate readiness attention to avoid grounding a platform and crippling readiness. This
cannot be projected two years earlier during the budget process. Therefore, there is a lag
in resources that affects the military's ability to acquire supply support. Under the current
budget system, if an organization suddenly has a heavy unanticipated requirement for a
certain part, there is risk that 1 ) limited funding exists to pay for the part and either funds
are taken from another item or 2) managers suffer delays in trying to procure a contract.
This risk is minimized in a budget that can expand and contract more easily, which
requires reforming the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).
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D. ORGANIZATION/METHODOLOGY
In our research we began by examining the definition of SMA and the variables
that could lead to the noted fill rate disparity. We then evaluated the depot support
systems using a sample PDM system for the Navy, Air Force, and UAS. By identifying
and comparing relevant variables of supply support delays across the respective supply
systems, we made recommendations for improving NADEP supply support.
Chapter I provides the background, illustrating the level of concern. It outlines the
structure and scope of the thesis. In Chapter II, we analyze whether or not SMA is an
appropriate tool for measuring supply support effectiveness for depot production. This
Chapter explores the SMA formula and defines its respective variables. Additionally, it
summarizes variables contributing to AWP time that are excluded from the formula.
Chapter III provides background on NADEP operations and assimilates data on prevalent
readiness degrader systems of the sample F-18 PDM platform. We break these degrader
systems down into respective parts requirements, their supply source and the variables
delaying parts receipt. We then identify the primary causes for supply delays affecting
production. Chapter IV and V follow the same structure for the Air Force and
commercial aviation depot systems, respectfully. In Chapter VI, we compare background
procedures on all three systems and match them with problem variables to provide
realistic recommendations that have proven successful. We also delineate conclusions on
the overall assessment outlining areas of further research.
We visited the three sites discussed to collect background information and data,
and discuss supply support issues with resident supply, production and planning
8
personnel. Additionally, we visited Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) to observe
procedures and conduct interviews with supply personnel.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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II. SMA AS A MEASUREMENT TOOL
A. DEFINITION
SMA is defined as the percent of requisitions satisfied/filled on the first pass
against system assets. It is prepared monthly by a computerized Uniformed Inventory
Control Point (UICP) program. The current Navy goal for SMA is 85%. [Ref. l:p. 44]
The formula for SMA is as follows:
„,„,„„ ,.. „ (Backorders Established + PBLCs Established),SMA (%) = 1 00 x {1 - ^ -}
Demand
Performance Based Logistics Contracts (PBLCs), formerly called Direct Vendor
Delivery (DVD), are items requisitioned by end users that are directly delivered from the
vendor surpassing the navy system. These are long term contracts that are already in
place and employ equivalent logistics time frames as the Navy Supply System. NAVICP
establishes a (PBLC) contract with a vendor to manufacture certain National Stock
Numbers (NSNs). The vendor uses NAVICP previous demand history to determine the
quantity per NSN that should be manufactured per quarter. From this point, NAVICP no
longer manages the items. The items are managed by the vendor include warehousing.
When an activity places a requisition for a PBLC item, the requisition is sent directly to
the vendor via NAVICP 's database. The vendor pulls the item from the warehouse and
ships the item to the activity.
The Backorders and the PBLCs consist of the items not supplied by the Naval
Supply System. For example, a SMA of 85% means that 85% of the requisitions placed
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into the system is being filled by the Naval Supply System. This measures the
effectiveness of Navy supply in filling requisitions of items normally stocked; it includes
all requisitions - both consumables and repairables. It reflects Navy Supply's ability to
fill any requisition. This measurement tool only reflects the quantity of requisitions filled.
It does not reflect the criticality or priority of the requisitions being filled.
B. SMA'S EFFECTIVENESS AS A TOOL
When selecting an effectiveness measurement tool, it is critical to consider both
who will be using the tool and their definition of effectiveness. SMA measures the Navy
Supply System's ability to fill requisitions. The user for this tool is Navy Supply
Inventory Managers, and the end calculation reveals whether or not Navy Supply has the
inventory to fill all supply requirements on the first pass. This does not necessarily
translate to supply effectiveness or readiness. If managers use SMA to measure supply
effectiveness or readiness, as in PBD-405, they will draw the wrong conclusions.
To further illustrate this misreading, consider an organization having one hundred
requisitions for the month; fifty requisitions are filled for paper, pens etc, thirty-five are
filled for maintenance actions, five are backordered and ten are PBLCs. Using the
formula, we would calculate SMA to be 85%. This formula lumps all requisitions types
together, whether it is pens and papers for note taking or a hydraulic pump preventing an
aircraft from flying. Pens and paper will most likely be negligent in affecting overall
readiness, where as the hydraulic part will seriously degrade readiness.
If you went to war with the presented scenario, you could administratively create
a strategic plan with the excellent fill rates for office supplies (fifty requisitions filled),
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but backorders and PBLCs for critical supply parts (five backordered, ten PBLCs) might
prevent the Navy from executing its strategic plan. SMA does not discriminate priorities.
SMA would equal 85%, indicating that effectiveness is good; yet readiness maybe poor.
Determining the appropriate measurement tool depends on the characteristic
being measured. If we are interested in readiness or production, PBLCs should not be
subtracted from the total obligations filled. With the current formula for SMA, a large
number of direct vendor deliveries or PBCLs would generate a low SMA; yet readiness
would be good if you fill the requisitions and the weapon systems continue to operate.
Alternatively, if an item manager is deciding if the Navy should keep a certain portion of
inventories in house, then SMA becomes a more effective tool.
The question posed in PBD-405, "Is SMA a good indicator of supply support to
the NADEP" is asking if the tool used to measure Navy Supply System supply support is
effective at measuring total NADEP supply support, not just Navy support. The answer is
that it is the wrong tool. Assuming that we are interested in NADEP supply support to
ensure NADEP production readiness, SMA only considers Navy supply support. When
we observe the NADEP backorders and PBLCs, we note that the SMA can be low
because of high backorders or because of high PBLCs. IfNADEP relies on PBLCs, this
would lower SMA even though parts requisitions are filled directly. Using SMA to
measure total supply support would inappropriately indicate that supply support is low.
If we are concerned with the effectiveness of supply for production, we are not
necessarily concerned about the source of supply. We would like to examine Supply's
ability to fill requisitions from any source on the first pass of critical parts that affect
13
production. We can directly link the impact of supply on production, recognizing that any
backorder can delay production. This is reflected by removing the PBLCs from the
formula and creating a new measurement tool SMA':
SMA'(%)=100x C-Backorders Established}
Demand
This formula succeeds in isolating backorders and eliminating effective supply
sources (PBLCs), but it does not account for skewed data because of variable priorities.
In other words, a high SMA could result from a high requisition of low priority items that
are not necessarily critical to the production process (i.e. indirect materials). Priority is
very difficult to incorporate into a measurement tool because priorities can change. For
example, a consumable gasket that is normally low priority could cause a production
delay; if it is critical, the production manager can raise the priority. In the case of
measuring supply support impact on production, priority requisitions are a critical aspect
of readiness.
To focus on readiness critical requisitions, it is more useful to look at SMA by
Issue Priority Groups (IPGs). The IPG determines the requisition's Priority Designator
(PD). The PD (01-15) expresses the relationship between the requisitioned assigned
force activity designator (FAD) and the selected urgency of need, and determines the
time frame within which the requisition will be processed. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-16] The FAD is a
Roman numeral (I through V) assigned by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the
Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) to indicate the mission essentiality of a unit, organization,
installation, project, or program to meet national objectives. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-64]
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In particular, IPG 1 and 2 would illustrate the effectiveness of supply support on
readiness critical requirements. IPG 1 and 2 consist of the most critical requisitions, those
with priority designators 01 through 03 and 04 through 08, respectively. PD 01 through
03 means that a unit or organization is unable to perform its mission. PD 04 through 08
means that a unit or organization's ability to perform its mission is severely impaired.
By using IPG's, changing priorities are already incorporated because decision
makers can raise the IPG in circumstances allowed by readiness requirements and
appropriate authorization. If we can focus the new SMA formula on these high priority
requisitions, we can measure the critical impact of supply to production readiness. We
will measure the "show-stopping" supply difficulties. This new formula SMAipg 1&2 will
give us a better indication of supply impact on production readiness:




Another measurement tool that is appropriate and has already been established is
Gross Effectiveness. This tool also measures supply support effectiveness in terms of
readiness. Gross effectiveness is the percent of total requisitions, for both stocked and
non-stocked items, received and satisfied from stock on hand at any given level of
inventory. In other words, it is the percent of total requisitions filled on site. Gross
effectiveness is mainly used by stock points and supply departments to measure customer
service. [Ref.l:p. 44]
Many managers may be tempted to use Operational Availability (A ). The
formula for Ao is:
15
MTBF
" MTBF +MTTR +MSRT
Where:
MTBF = Mean time between failure
MTTR = Mean time to repair
MSRT = Mean supply response time
This tool is not appropriate to measure supply support in the question posed in
PDB-405, "Has NADEP production been impacted by poor supply support?" Ao could
provide a preliminary indication of supply impact on production; however, the data
would have to be mined further to differentiate Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT)
and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). MSRT would indicate supply's impact on
production, while MTTR better reflects manpower, troubleshooting, maintenance, and or
availability of support equipment. The most appropriate measurement tools to isolate
supply impact on production are SMAipgi&2 and/or gross effectiveness.
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III. NAVAL AVIATION DEPOTS
A. BACKGROUND
1. Defining a NADEP
In Naval Aviation Maintenance there are three levels of repair: operational level,
where technicians remove and replace repairable items; intermediate level, where there is
higher technical expertise and more complex repair; and depot level, where the highest
level of expertise exists and heaviest "overhaul" maintenance occurs. We will focus on
depot level maintenance, which has three general functions: 1) rework of existing
aviation end items, including both maintenance and modification, 2) manufacturing items
and components, and 3) support services including professional engineering, technology
and calibration. The organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 2.
There are three NADEPs conforming to this structure; NADEP Jacksonville, FL;
NADEP Cherry Point, NC and NADEP North Island, CA. These NADEPs service
different aircraft platforms, but each mirrors the other in most respects. NADEP North
Island, the NADEP selected for this thesis, maintains a workload of approximately 30%
aircraft repair/overhaul, 24% component repair, 1% engine repair, and 45% support
services. The aircraft this facility services include E-2, C-2, F/A-18, S-3 and H-60, with
F/A-18s comprising 77% of the aircraft workload. We will focus on the F/A-18 system,







































Figure 2. A NADEP Organizational Structure. [From Ref. 5]
We observed the E-2, C-2 and S-3 platforms and found that the majority of supply
difficulties were due to aging aircraft. For example, data on C-2 support reveals that a
little over 40% of two years worth of requisitions were backorders with excessive lead
ti, ss due to obsolescent and diminishing manufacturing sources. [Ref. 4:p. 2] These
aircraft are in service beyond their original design intent. As a result, there are limited
suppliers to provide replacement parts, causing long lead times for supply. This is a
serious issue requiring top-level leadership attention.
2. Funding
Because a NADEP is a Working Capital Fund (WCF) organization, forecasting
workload becomes extremely critical in planning operations. Funds are acquired through
job orders place by Operations and Maintenance appropriated activities. There is a cash
18
corpus that a NADEP may draw from, but the main source of funding comes from these
appropriated activities. A customer sends work orders. The NADEP provides the service,
pays for the expense and bills the customer. Then, the customer pays the bill replenishing
the WCF. The cost of a job is based on rates derived from the full cost of operating a
NADEP. This job costing system in each WCF activity must achieve a net operating
result of zero for the execution year. This system of funding provides direct input to the
workload and resources 2 years in advance; this input can significantly impact
forecasting.
Although this system of funding accounts for all costs, it also causes many
difficulties in planning. Because funding relies upon Operations and Maintenance
appropriations, planning for costs occurs in the PPBS cycle calling for predictions two
years ahead of time. Unfortunately, many things can happen between the approval of a
budget and its execution. Yesterday's predicted modifications and repairs may not be the
same as tomorrow's critical modifications or repairs. Additionally, an operating unit may
cancel his job order because of operational commitments. This causes a "death spiral,"
where the cost of hiring additional personnel for the expected workload is no longer
covered by the remaining job orders. This phenomenon causes overhead to be spread
over fewer items, which causes the next year's rates to be higher reducing the number of
job orders, and driving the future rates even higher.
3. Forecasting
Forecasting for aircraft overhaul involves assessing the aircraft operation service
period (OSP), which is the time between required depot level maintenance requirements
determined by engineering reliability factors. Theoretically, if an aircraft receives
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standard depot level maintenance at the end of this service period, the aircraft will be
returned very close to its inherent reliability. Ideally, squadrons would receive a
replacement aircraft, as they turn an aircraft in to a NADEP at the end of its OSP. But,
this does not always happen because of budgetary constraints.
This phenomenon coupled with the fact that aircraft turned into NADEPs appear
to have remaining service life laid to the foundation for the Aircraft Service Period
Adjustment (ASPA) program in 1982. This program was built on the idea that not all
aircraft degrade in condition at the same rate; therefore, aircraft should be inducted to the
depot on the basis of material condition. This allows for longer operational use of assets.
The ASPA program is currently used to determine NADEP inductions. This
program involves sending a planning and estimator (P&E) team to a squadron to inspect
an aircraft at its OSP. The inspector team assesses the aircraft's material condition and
either recommends induction into the NADEP or defers it for a year. The P&E team
returns the following year and continues the process until the aircraft is recommended for
induction. In many cases, aircraft are deferred for an additional ten years. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
Because this maintenance is deferred by subjective means and operational hours
are extended well beyond engineering failure determinations, the level of uncertainty
significantly increases. This uncertainty complicates NADEP 's planning for
unanticipated maintenance discrepancies, which results in incorrect labor and material
cost and longer turn around times. Uncertainty concerning discrepancies eliminates
predictability in expected parts required, labor required and scheduling required. As a
result, managers cannot minimize supply lead times prior to induction.
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Due to unpredictability and inability to meet budget targets, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) directed NAVAIR to eliminate the ASPA program and start a program
with established fixed period end dates for all platform overhauls. In 1998, NAVAIR
started the Integrated Maintenance Concept (IMC). IMC is a Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) based analysis and packaging of O/I/D level preventive maintenance
tasks in a platforms Maintenance Plan. This ensures that the tasks are performed at the
right location and interval, by the appropriate level of maintenance, providing the highest
degrees of availability and readiness at the lowest overall Life Cycle Cost (LCC).
Although NAVAIR is requiring all platforms to implement IMC, ASPAs are still being
performed in the fleet. Platforms are phasing in EMC at different intervals at different
sites. When fully implemented, IMC should eliminate the unpredictability and assist in
budgeting for scheduled aircraft maintenance.
4. Induction Planning
Induction planning occurs semi-annually with both NAVICP-Philadelphia for
components and NAVAIR for aircraft. During these conferences, demand is matched
with capacity and capability to ensure that customers' needs are met and resources are
used efficiently. NADEP planners and estimators examine the proposed workload
requirements to determine if NADEPs have the capacity and resources to meet
NAVICP's or NAVAIR's requirements. Actual inductions are then negotiated to balance
repair requirements, plant capacity, resource availability and utilization. The NADEPs
take this schedule and develop weekly induction schedules.
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5. The Overhaul Process
Once an F/A-18 arrives for overhaul, it completes the following phases;
induction, disassembly/evaluation, repair/modification, assembly, systems check, and
paint. Induction identifies system discrepancies needing repair and modifications
requiring implementation, by reviewing logbooks, the Aircraft Discrepancy Book (ADB)
and pilot debriefs. The aircraft is then assessed physically. After conducting a material
condition inspection to determine corrosion and paint requirements, NADEP engineers
disassemble the aircraft for further examination and evaluation. This inspection follows a
standard specification, reflecting a checklist of components to inspect based on failure
data; engineers compare and evaluate aircraft components against this list of typical
repairs required in overhaul. Discrepancies above and beyond the standard specification
are also evaluated.
Structural repairs and modifications take place during the repair and modification
phase. Parts are removed and replaced; removed, repaired and then replaced; or removed,
cannibalized and replaced. The majority of the supply decisions made in this phase
directly impact the TAT. Once repairs are completed, the aircraft is ready for the
assembly phase. All parts are received and installed during this phase, and systems
checks are conducted. The systems test phase continues this testing. Once the checks are
complete, the aircraft is forwarded to the test flight line for more systems checks and a
test flight. Upon completion, the aircraft undergoes the paint phase, receiving major
touch up and zonal painting. The ADB and logbooks are then reviewed and annotated for











Figure 3. NADEP Aircraft Overhaul Process.
6. The Supply Process
NADEP North Island's supply system offers seven options to acquire needed
parts. Although some parts are ordered and prepositioned prior to induction, based on
specification standards, most requisitions are conducted as early as possible after
induction. If a discrepancy requires a part, a requisition is placed in the system. The part
can be acquired through:
Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) Inventory







All NADEPs maintain a NTF inventory; however, NADEP North Island has
significantly reduced its NIF inventory to raw material. To make the organization more
efficient, NADEP North Island initiated a partnership with FISC San Diego. This unique
relationship served as the foundation for a focus store. FISC funding establishes an
inventory of parts for this focus store, based on NADEP internal demand information.
This is a highly trusting relationship because FISC funds the parts upfront and charges
the NADEP when the part is retrieved from the inventory. Both the NIF inventory and the
focus store are located on site.
If a part is not in stock in either the NIF or focus store, the requirement is
forwarded to NAVICP-P or DLA. If these organizations do not have the inventory, the
part is placed in a backorder status and a contract is initiated to procure the part. The
contracting process can take anywhere from one to eighteen months. If the backorder
status reveals a long lead-time, the part can possibly be manufactured in house, if the
specifications are obtainable.
If the part is in the Naval Supply System inventory, which includes the NIF,
Focus Store, NAVICP-P or DLA, the Naval Supply System will fill the requisition. If it is
not available in the Naval Supply System inventory (i.e. parts do not exist in the system),
the part can be manufactured by the NADEP, procured with a credit card or procured by
establishing a contract, as seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. NADEP North Island Requisition Flow.
For fiscal year (FY) 1999, NADEP North Island acquired 1% of their requisitions
by manufacturing items in house, 7% through credit card and contracting, 41% from
NAVICP and DLA, 38% from the focus store, and 13% are due in from NAVICP and
DLA. These results illustrate the FISC partnership through focus stores benefits NADEP,
and they show that NAVICP and DLA are the key providers for aviation components.
B. DATA COLLECTION FOR READINESS DEGRADERS
To assess supply's impact on production, we collected the top 10 F/A-18
readiness degraders (Table 2, page 30). These readiness degraders are components /repair
parts that have been backordered long enough to delay overhauls, and the parts shortages
plague multiple aircraft inductions. Readiness degraders are used by NAVAIR, Type
Commanders (TYCOMs) and NADEPs as management tools to make resource allocation
decisions. These are the driving factors in turn around time and production delays.
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After identifying the top 10 degraders for the F/A-18, we researched the
respective supply status in the fleet. All of these degrader systems are managed by
NAVICP. Although NADEP requirements are included in the fleet totals, the causes for
supply delays are identical to those in the fleet.
Out of the ten degraders, six are Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS). This
means that six degraders are components that are critical for the aircraft to fly.
Additionally, seven of the components have 0-3 units Ready for Issue (RFI) stock on
hand. This means there is no inventory of these components in the fleet; if a weapon
system needs the part, the weapon system will no longer be operable. Four of these 0-3
stock on hand components (Hook Assembly, Cylinder and Piston, Main Shock Absorber,
Axial Pump) need over 1500 NMCS backordered piece parts to fulfill demand directly
for the operating fleet. Additionally, these components have over 4000 backorders of
piece parts to fill IPG 1&2 requisitions. In the case of the Hook Assembly, there are over
88,000 backordered piece parts.
We further researched these four backordered components and found average
backorder periods to be one year (Hook Assembly), two years (Cylinder and Piston), one
year (Main Shock Absorber) and 1.5 years (Axial Pump). Discovering these excessive
waiting times, (well beyond the average overhaul rum around time) for supply parts with
no inventory on hand, led us to investigate the underlying causes for such a crippling
support posture. We found each of these components experienced a drastic increase in
demand, followed by the supply system's inability to meet the demand.
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1. Hook Assembly
The Hook Assembly is provided by Boeing, who is part of a Basic Order
Agreement (BOA) with the government. This is a written instrument of understanding,
negotiated between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and a contractor,
that contains (1) terms and clauses applying to future contracts (orders) between the
parties during its term, (2) a description, as specific as practicable, of supplies or services
to be provided, and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering future orders under
the basic ordering agreement. A BOA is not a contract but may be used to expedite
contracting for uncertain requirements for supplies or services when specific items,
quantities, and prices are not known when the agreement is executed, but the government
expects to purchase a substantial number of the supplies or services covered by the
agreement.
Boeing has not been able to meet established schedules and is experiencing long
lead times of three years. When an aircraft is broken down for overhaul, NADEP has
been experiencing an increasing and excessive scrap rate. In particular, the shank for the
Hook Assembly has been difficult to obtain. A Logistics Engineering Change Proposal
(LECP) is in progress to modify some of the specifications for this shank and the Dayton
and Brown company is testing the hook assembly for service life extension. However,
these prospective solutions will not reduce the long lead-time required to receive parts off
the production line.
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2. Cylinder and Piston
The Cylinder and Piston component involves a long-term contract with Castle
Precision that began in 1995. This company defaulted because they could never deliver
the item. SHL, an Israeli Company, provided a few of the cylinder and piston
components, but not the quantity that the schedule required. The fleet began experiencing
maintenance problems as well. Two companies All Tool and NASA Tool, won contracts
in February 2000 to manufacture these items. The finished products should be delivered
to the fleet in the summer of 2001. Normally, the lead-time for such a contract is 2 years;
these companies are cutting this by a few months.
3. Main Shock Absorber
The Main Shock Absorber experienced an unanticipated 500% spike in demand
due to corrosion problems. This was caused by quality and delinquent delivery problems
under a sole source contract with an Israeli Company. This five-year contract was
initiated in 1995. In response to such an overwhelming demand, a number of CONUS
American companies are being contracted to provide multiple avenues to meet the
demand. Currently, a New York company, NASA Tooling has passed first article test; All
Tool and Blair Industry are going through engineering qualification. By pursuing
multiple long-term contracts, NAVICP hopes to prevent similar sole source contracting
problems in the future. Once NAVICP's engineering team approves first article testing,
the administrative portion of contracting may begin.
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4. Axial and Pump
The Axial and Pump items are products of a Parker and Hannifin contract that is
also a Basic Ordering Agreement, similar to the Boeing agreement. This company is
experiencing growing pains after a Virginia plant closed and a plant opened in
Kalamazoo, Michigan. The experience of company personnel is limited. Simultaneously,
NADEP has experienced problems with the plating process and repeatedly received piece
parts that were different with each order. As a result, the company will assemble an
overhaul kit with standard bit piece parts required for repair. This kit will have its own
part number and will be available in June 2001.
Key:
NAVICP BB Actual number of backorders for the entire component. The






Non Mission Capable Supply (Requirements of the operational
fleet that can not be meet by the supply system)
NMCS BB piece parts backordered
IPG I BB Issue Priority Group I Backorders for piece parts
IPG II BB Issue Priority Group II Backorders for piece parts (Requisitions
from Supply Departments to fill inventories up to allowances)
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1. Levels of Maintenance
The latest AF 21-101 instruction, dated October 1998, describes the Air Force's
new level of repair concept. This concept was announced in 1989, concluding an Air
Force and RAND Corporation test. The Air Force is phasing in a two level maintenance
concept (2LM) versus the previous three levels of maintenance similar to the Navy's
operational, intermediate, and depot levels. The Air Force disbanded their intermediate
level maintenance facilities for various platforms and disseminated its functions to either
the flight line or depot repair shops. Because of a lack of experience and appropriate test
equipment in some repair capabilities, the intermediate maintenance level still remains
for several aircraft types. Under 2LM, depot repair is tied directly to the flight line and
relates directly to unit sortie capabilities. This translates to an operational level of base
maintenance that must have enough capability to launch and recover aircraft and sustain
the preventive maintenance program.
When a maintenance problem is beyond the first level repair, it is forwarded
expeditiously to one of the three Air Logistics Centers (ALC): Tinker ALC, Warner
Robbins ALC, and Hill ALC. By eliminating intermediate maintenance, the Air Force is
relying on new "Lean Logistics" initiatives and "high velocity" parts movements to
compensate for eliminating I-level. In Lean Logistics, the Air Force applies "best
business practices" across wholesale and retail functions to reduce inventories and costs
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and improve mission capability. These "best business practices" include modern
communications, computer controls and transportation initiatives. In this new
environment, readiness translates in to improving pipeline processes, moving repairables
to depot repair centers and total asset visibility.
2. The ALC
An ALC is a major center of Air Force logistics. It reports directly to the Air
Force Material Command (AFMC) under the logistics division, which provides a
logistics chain of command for the depot.
The Depot is a division of the ALC logistics management directorate. The
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Figure 5. ALC Organizational Structure. [From Ref. 6]
Each ALC provides "industrial support to aircraft repair," and the depot is
charged with programmed Depot Level Maintenance (PDM), Unprogrammed Depot
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Level Maintenance (UDLM), scheduled modifications and unpredictable requirements to
aircraft. A standard Weapon System Support Center (WSSC) structure comprises the
depot. Each aircraft system is led by a "fixer" who is responsible for aircraft specific
production. The WSSC reports to the fixer, and is a multi-functional, one-stop
organization supporting the mechanic. The WSSC synchronizes production management,
































Figure 6. Weapon System Support centers Organizational Structure. [From Ref. 7]
Hill ALC provides depot support to three major aircraft systems; F-16, A- 10 and
the C-130. We observed the A- 10 platform and found that the majority of supply
difficulties were due to aging aircraft. This aircraft is in service beyond its original design
intent. As a result, limited suppliers provide replacement parts, causing long lead times
for supply. We also observed the F-16 process and discovered that this platform does not
have a PDM program. It is only under a modification process. As a result, we chose to
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focus on the C-130 aircraft. Hill ALC provides depot support on this platform for both
the Navy and Air Force.
3. Funding
The Air Force depot, like a NADEP, is a Working Capital Fund (WCF)
organization. Funds are similarly acquired through the job orders placed by Operations
and Maintenance appropriated activities. The Product Support Business Area (PSBA) of
the AFMC is responsible for assuring data is provided for forecasting supply and repair
requirements. The cost of a job is based on rates derived from the full cost of operating
the depot. This job costing system in each WCF activity must achieve a net operating
result of zero for the execution year.
This system of funding causes the same difficulties in planning for the Air Force
as for the NADEPs. Planning in the PPBS cycle calls for predictions two years in
advance, creating a difficult resource situation for the unpredictable modifications and
repairs necessary for safety. If more work is required than predicted, or if jobs are
scheduled but do not occur, the published cost rates are no longer in line with
requirements, causing mismatches in resources.
4. Forecasting
Predicting when an aircraft is due for overhaul in the Air Force depends on an
established flight hour threshold. This threshold takes into account mission design series
and age through a Programmed Depot Maintenance date. The theory is similar to all
overhaul systems in that an aircraft receiving standard depot level maintenance at this
threshold will be returned very close to its inherent reliability. This scheduled PDM date
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is a hard date. It does not have uncertainties like the ASPA program. This reduces the
uncertainty in determining workload requirements. If an Air Force aircraft is not inducted
within the designated PDM time window, + or - 90 days, the aircraft is grounded. To
further minimize uncertainty in workload magnitude and type, the Air Force creates a tail
number specific aircraft production schedule, to focus on synchronizing logistics support
and direct labor. This allows fixer become familiar with the aircraft in advance and
efficiently and effectively plan resources well ahead of the operation start date. The fixer
is able to specify a specific work package by mission design and series and by tail
number.
5. Induction Planning
Induction planning is accomplished by the Material Management Team Lead
(MMTL), which includes supply support, inventory storage and distribution, production
support, engineering and procurement. This team, along with a supportability team,
conducts five types of supportability reviews, to determine the critical path of the process
and anticipate and prevent any resource road blocks. The first review is a two-year joint
supportability review. The first review determines whether the work is supportable and
whether it is approved or not. Once the supportability statement is issued, item managers
ensure contracts are in place or renewed so that required supplies are available.
Subsequently, annual supportability reviews are conducted with the master
scheduler, planner, fixer, budget analyst, DLA and the engineers. This supportability
team ensures all resources are in place; and they determine if stock levels are valid, or
should be increased or decreased. Similar quarterly and monthly supportability reviews
are conducted. The fifth supportability review is a rolling 10-day "forward look"
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conducted by the tail team (the production team that actually performs the work). During
these reviews, required parts are reserved in tail number bins to be delivered by a material
handler to the forward service area on a just in time basis.
Once a tail number-specific aircraft production schedule is developed, aircraft
management will man-load to the schedule on multiple shifts, within existing constraints.
This reduces the aircraft in work at one time to increase the flow velocity through the
depot. Direct laborers are assigned and prepare the forward support area where the
aircraft is repaired and where all other resources will be pulled. This allows the direct
labor to focus on their aircraft repair tasks without being concerned with logistics.
To further synchronize scheduling, back shops integrate the aircraft schedule
requirements into their scheduling activities. A synchronization team then deconflicts
multiple priorities in the back shops across different customers. These are all efforts to
minimize the number of flow days.
6. The Overhaul Process
The overhaul process for a C-130 at Hill ALC is very similar to the NADEP's
process. However, because a tail number is assigned, the tail team has the added benefit
of reviewing the aircraft's specific records prior to induction through a pre-induction
conference. The aircraft then goes through a pre-dock inspection and evaluation. The
aircraft then goes through a disassembly phase, followed by the indock activities, repair
and modification. Unexpected discrepancies are incorporated into the master schedule or
deferred back to the operational squadron, depending on resource availability and flight
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safety. Added work is supplemented to the non-critical path. Unpredictable requirements
are expected to occur less than 20% of the time.
Once repairs are completed, the aircraft is ready for assembly. This phase ensures
all parts are received and installed and systems checks are conducted. The post-dock
activities include the test flight and painting. The aircraft records are then reviewed and
annotated for transfer back to the force. It is important to note that most of the supply









Figure 7. Hill ALC Depot Aircraft Overhaul Process.
7. The Supply Process
Hill ALC's supply system offers five options to acquire needed parts. The Air
Force stages most common items near the depot for PDMs. If a discrepancy requires a
part, a requisition is placed in the system. The part can be acquired through:
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The Air Force inventory includes two types of funding: Supply Management
Activity Group (SMAG) and Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG). SMAG is the
resource used to fill Air Force spare parts needs in war and peace, and maintains
inventory management of approximately 2.2 million items, both consumable and
repairable. DMAG overhauls and repairs systems and spare parts directly for the force as
well as for SMAG. (SMAG functions similar to NAVICP)
If a part is not in stock in the Air Force inventory, the requirement is forwarded to
DLA. IfDLA does not have it in inventory, the part is placed on backorder and a contract
is initiated to procure the part. If the backorder involves a long lead-time, the part can
possibly be manufactured in house, if the specifications are available.
If the part is in the Air Force Supply System inventory, the SMAG, DMAG or
DLA, the requirement will be filled by the activity possessing the part. If it is not
available in the Air Force inventory (i.e. parts do not exist in the system), the part can be
manufactured by the depot, procured with a credit card or procured by establishing a
contract, as illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Hill ALC Depot Requisition Flow
For fiscal year (FY) 1999, Hill ALC acquired 3% of their requisitions by
manufacturing items in house, 12% through credit card and contracting, 43% from DLA
and 32% from SMAG/DMAG. These results illustrate that the Air Forces' focus on high
velocity expediting of parts has increased reliability of both in-house inventory and Hill's
contracting personnel.
B. DATA COLLECTION FOR READINESS DEGRADERS
While collecting data at Hill ALC, we discussed the supply posture and
production scheduling for the C-130 with both the master scheduler and the material
manager. The master scheduler revealed that the flow time for Navy C-130s (132 days)
was longer than the flow time for Air Force C-130s (112 days). At least two factors are
responsible. The first involves the ASPA program, the scheduling system for C-130's,
and its subsequent unpredictability. In an effort to minimize unpredictability, Hill ALC
received assigned tail numbers from NAVAIR for the first time. However, Hill ALC was
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waiting for ASPA results on the first tail number assigned aircraft. If the aircraft passed
ASPA inspection, Hill ALC would loose 16,000 hours. The second factor was the
additional work required in the Navy specification. For example, Navy aircraft require
wheel well blasting because they are more corroded. This is a specification that the Air
Force does not require.
The material manager indicated that Hill ALC has a fairly successful supply
posture. They rarely had supply difficulties because they could initiate their own
contracts with commercial companies. C-130s also have many commercial applications.
However, most of the difficulties they experienced related to backorders through DLA. A
specific example was a backordered reparable required by Hill ALC that was available
through a local vendor. The DLA spot buy program that is supposed to acquire the assets
within 24 hours took four weeks, the Hill ALC material activity took a few days to
acquire the part.
To further assess supply impact on production, we collected the top C-130
readiness degraders (Table 3). These readiness degraders are components where
backorders over a period of time have delayed the overhaul process in multiple aircraft
inductions. These are the driving factors in turn around time and production delays.
After identifying the top degraders for the C-130, we researched the respective
supply status for each item. These degraders are managed by DSCR or DSCP. Although
ALC Hill's requirements are included in the fleet totals, the causes for supply delays are
identical to those in the fleet.
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Out of the eighteen degraders, fifteen are Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS).
This means that fifteen degraders are components that are critical for the aircraft to fly.
Additionally, none of the components have Ready for Issue (RFI) stock on hand. This
means there is no inventory of these components in the fleet; if a weapon system needs
the part, the weapon system will no longer be operable
We further researched five of the degraders; Chine Flight Plate, Blind Rivet,
Gasket, Anti-Icing Spacer, and Aircraft Cable/Wire rope assembly. Average backorder
periods ranged anywhere from 8 months to 1.5 years. Although these waiting times are
half the waiting time for F-18 degraders, they are still beyond the average turn around
time and impacted production. We further investigated the underlying causes.
1. Chine Flight Plate
The Chine Flight Plate is provided by Airborne Technologies Incorporated. It has
been backordered since April 1999 and has a long lead time due to procurement
difficulties (Administrative Lead Time (ALT) and Procurement Lead Time (PLT) of 420
days). In an effort to minimize escalating backorders and provide a short-term solution,
DSCR contracted with Hill ALC in May of 2000 to induct 38 "G" condition assets for
repair. "G" condition indicates a component is not in the repair process but is awaiting
parts or awaiting induction following the receipt of all required parts. This contract was
scheduled for delivery on 19 September 2000. Due to unavailable piece parts, the
schedule slipped and delivery has been pushed back to 3 January 2001. DSCR is
requesting that Hill ALC provide a partial delivery in December 2000. Their long-term
solution involved awarding a contract to Airborne, on 18 October 2000, for 38 assets with
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a delivery date of 12 December 2001. With an average quarterly demand of 5, these two
contracts should cover backorders and provide sufficient shelf stock.
2. Blind Rivet
The Blind Rivet is managed by DSCP. This item has experienced an
unanticipated 200% increase in demand over the last 6 months. This is a very high
demand, high volume item receiving 500 to 600 requisitions annually. Each requisition
involves 100 to 700 rivets. A contract for 215,180 rivets was awarded to "Alfast
Fastening System" in Sept 2000, for delivery in Feb 2001. Although this will improve
inventory by covering backorders and replenishing shelf stock, the wait from Sept 2000
until Feb 2001 appears excessive for an item as common as a rivet. Additionally, with an
average quarterly demand of 41,403, and over 50,000 backorders to be processed, the
current order will only meet demand for four quarters before backorders create another
problem. There is currently no follow-on contract.
3. Gaskets
The Gasket has backorders over eight months old with no contract in place. After
speaking with the DSCP item manager, we found that there are contractors to make the
item, but that they are waiting for a purchase request to be awarded. The DSCP item
managers are overseeing an increased number of line items, increasing the workload on
contracting specialists. This reflects the ALC's consolidation and a simultaneous
reduction in ALC's labor force due to downsizing. This has caused excessive delays in
awarding contracts. Currently, the gasket has a total backorder of 818 gaskets and an
average quarterly demand of 875 gaskets.
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4. Anti-Icing Spacer
The Anti-Icing Spacer is provided by Lockheed Martin, with backorders in excess
of 6 months. An outstanding contract was awarded on 25 October 2000, for a quantity of
795 spacers with a delivery date of June 2001. Currently, there are 388 backorders for
this item; average quarterly demand is 140 spacers. At the current demand rate, it will
only take 3 quarters to deplete the quantity on the existing contract. With ALT of 97 days
and PLT of 100 days, action for follow-on contracts has not been established and will
cause another stock out.
5. Wire rope and Aircraft Cable
The Prison Industry produces the Wire Rope Assembly and Aircraft Cable. They
have been unable to meet the delivery schedule. In order to satisfy the immediate
requirements, Hill ALC has been routing "G" condition assets to the back shops for
repair. Hill ALC has 62 cables and wires that are designated degraders for the C-130.
Twenty-six of the sixty-two (42%) have zero stock on hand. For a long term solution,
Hill presently has Small Business Innovation Research Engineering (SBIRE) doing first
article test for the cables and wires. ALC is requesting that DLA provide a long-term
multi vendor contract to alleviate future production delays.
Key:
SOH Stock on Hand
ROP Reorder Point
NMCS Non Mission Capable Supply (Requirements of the
operational fleet that can not be meet by the supply system)
NMCS BB piece parts backordered
EPG I BB Issue Priority Group I Backorders for piece parts
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• IPG II BB Issue Priority Group II Backorders for piece parts
(Requisitions from Supply Departments to fill inventories up to
allowances)
















Chine Flight Plate $3,634.81 15 Y 4 13 2
1560-00-
326-8581
Access Cover $ 9,854.68 1 Y 1
1560-00-
716-2904
Flap Yoke $999.10 64 Y 5 7
1560-00-
691-2945
Aircraft Skin $2,310.10 24 Y 1 5 4
1560-01-
301-3230
Duct Assembly $550.14 14 Y 5 8 1
1560-01-
326-0829
Trailing Edge $509.15 46 Y 1 5 4
5320-01-
143-5079
Blind Rivet $.29 156,825 Y 200 2703 6913
5330-00-
634-9387
Gasket $4.90 3,417 N 94 145
1560-00-
673-1555
Anti-Icing Spacer $7.14 590 N 261 3734
1560-00-
670-2157
Brush Seal $ 16.93 242 Y 1 60
Table 3. ALC Hill AFB C-130 Top Readiness Degraders of 23 Oct 2000.
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Hook Assembly $ 170.55 145 N 8 20
12 1680-01-
320-7417
Wire Rope Assembly $ 20.70 84 Y 1 10 17
13 1680-01-
320-7428
Wire Rope Assembly $ 48.07 128 Y 1 15 1
14 1680-01-
321-0007
Aircraft Cable $7.38 630 Y 95 128
15 1680-01-
321-0009
Aircraft Cable $ 33.42 98 Y 4 18 1
16 1680-01-
321-0011
Aircraft Cable $ 34.28 90 Y 7 19 5
17 1680-01-
321-0685
Aircraft Cable $48.57 70 Y 1 3 1
18 1680-01-
321-0687
Aircraft Cable $43.17 77 Y 2 12 4
Table 3. (cont'd) ALC Hill AFB C-130 Top Readiness Degraders of 23 Oct 2000.
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V. UNITED AIRLINE SERVICES
A. BACKGROUND
1. The Industry
The commercial airline industry is driven by profit. Large aircraft are such capital
intensive investments' that maintenance becomes a "double edged" sword of reliability
versus minimizing maintenance down time. Reliability is critical because a cancelled
flight can reduce revenues in subsequent flights, and ruin future business reputation, and
generates costs for replacement flight vouchers, hotel reservations and related
accommodations. To maintain inherent reliability, aircraft must undergo preventive
maintenance, as well as modifications and repair. However, every day an aircraft is down
for maintenance is a day lost carrying paying customers. United Airline Services (UAS)
simultaneously maintains their profitability and reliability by minimizing maintenance
cycle times, standardizing aircraft and building alliances.
Minimizing cycle time involves minimizing unpredictable repairs. UAS uses a
two level repair system including line maintenance and heavy maintenance. Cycle time is
minimized by conducting around the clock maintenance, planning based on data profiles
for each aircraft type, and by ensuring parts are immediately available.
The line maintenance level of repair involves removing and replacing items. Line
maintenance includes 60 maintenance support stations worldwide. With over $ 400
million in line removable parts, inventory's strategically positioned in support stations
located in major airports.
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At the higher level of maintenance, UAS processed over 600 airframe overhauls,
600 engine overhauls and SI. 5 million in removable aircraft components annually in
three heavy maintenance facilities: San Francisco, Oakland, and Indianapolis. Heavy
maintenance services cover the following systems:
Airframes Engines





The commercial industry standardizes aircraft types. Two primary manufactures
focus on standardization: Boeing and Airbus. Each aircraft, of each aircraft type is
configured identically, and most of the systems are similar between types.
Standardization improves spare parts availability, and reduces inventory and
maintenance troubleshooting. Additionally, it has led many airlines to build alliances.
United Airlines is currently in a "star alliance" with Air France and Delta. These
companies have jointly invested in stand-up maintenance service companies that focus on
core competencies. This ensures quality maintenance and profitability. Through
standardization, these alliances are able to share resources and inventory and avoid union
difficulties.
Our study focuses on the heavy maintenance facility located at San Francisco
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Figure 9. United Airlines Organizational Chart. [From Ref. 7]
2. Funding
United Airlines is financially organized by profit and cost centers. Each of these
centers develops and submits annual corporate goals using historical data on volume,
projected volume, percent mark-up, inflation and exchange rates. Additionally, these
centers submit monthly cost and profit forecasts for the current plus 3 subsequent months.
Forecasts include probability factors, reliability factors, scrap rates and demand. These
are used in an economic order quantity model with policy levels and protection levels.
Once these are established, they are placed into the master inventory records and are
reviewed periodically for new trends in their internal databases. These forecasts assist in
developing an annual budget.
However, centers may exceed these projected amounts. There are many occasions
where maintenance shop supervisors order parts and purchasing authorizes funds even
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though the costs exceed the budget. Typically, United Airlines Services is over budget
every year because of unanticipated repairs. This past year they were $7 million over
budget.
3. Induction Planning
The base aircraft scheduling division conducts both long range and short range
planning. Long range planning consists of a 5 year forecast, called a 5-year dock
utilization plan. Induction planning is based on overhaul schedules and other corporate
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Figure 10. UAL Dock Utilization Plan. [From Ref. 13]
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Some of the feasibility considerations incorporated into this plan include:
Do we have enough physical capacity (hangar/ramp space) to
accommodate the planned work?
Does schedule flexibility constitute acceptable risk?
Can we get the required allocation?
Does the schedule/plan meet corporate objectives?
Does the schedule/plan meet contractual and government regulations?
This long-term dock utilization plan is then transferred into a more flexible short
range rolling 18-month plan. This plan takes regular overhaul visits and incorporates
special maintenance programs, regulatory requirements, corporate marketing and
reliability modifications. This plan is updated continuously with changes in requirements,
delays and other contingencies.
Some of the cost considerations include:
Is there a productivity penalty for alternate locations?
What are the allocation costs?
Have we combined comparable visits?
Are crews and other resources used effectively?
What is the cost to position the aircraft and/or resources?
To make the planning documents as accurate as possible, communication between
maintenance and planning is frequent. Line and heavy maintenance station reviews are
conducted at daily meetings, at a six-week review and at a quarterly status and current
year review.
4. The Overhaul Process
The overhaul process at UAS is a health check system or a series of in depth
maintenance sessions that include modification and repair. These checks or visits have
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established cycles based on age and ongoing reliability data analysis. The first visit is an
A-Check, which is every 400 hours for a B757. The next visit is called a C-Check, which
is every 456 days for the 757. During this check, normally lasting anywhere from 10 to
20 days, the aircraft is opened and inspected, high time items are removed and replaced,
and service bulletins are often incorporated.
The next level check is a MidPeriod visit (MPV) that is conducted approximately
every five years, or at the Base Check Period (BCP). The MPV for a 777 takes
approximately 15 days. The next level check is the BCP, which has a 10-year cycle time.
This check is conducted over a 60-day period, in which all of the frames are replaced.
Both MPV's and BCP's are heavier maintenance actions, and alternate systems
are overhauled. For example, HMV-1 is an MPV that is odd requiring flight controls
maintenance, and even HMV's require airframes work. As the aircraft ages, the cycle
time expands on these maintenance visits. These cycle times are updated by running a
database of average cycle times and required regulations and modifications.
The actual overhaul process is primarily based on the NADEP system. Many of
the management tools are very similar to those used by the military. Upon induction, the
aircraft is opened and inspected, based on inspection cards similar to Navy and Air Force
specifications. Simultaneously, high time items are removed and replaced. Through
inspection cards, administrative notes (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requirements) and service bulletins, inspectors and mechanics manually write
discrepancies.
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There are normally 200 job cards for an aircraft. Approximately 250 write-ups
normally involve cabin discrepancies. The technicians typically find another fifty
discrepancies. These discrepancies are collected and tracked at a center production
control, which monitors workloads and prioritizes actions using visual display boards.
Normally all necessary parts are available. There is a general policy against
cannibalization; however, there have been occasions when a spare part for a new aircraft
that is still in production is not available. In these cases, UAS will cannibalize from the
assembly line. The overhaul line is the priority for support. Most delays in cycle time are
due to planning and skill sets. The difficulties in planning reflect inadequate post
production support programs; the skill sets difficulties reflect deficiencies in technical
skills.
Once repairs are complete, the aircraft is assembled. After the aircraft is
assembled, functional and operational checks are performed to ensure all systems operate
correctly. UAS then sends the aircraft to an outsourced company for painting. UAS
outsources painting to avoid all the associated Occupational Safety and Hazard
Administration (OSHA) requirements. Lastly, documentation is reviewed before the
aircraft is placed back in service. Figure 1 1 shows the overhaul process at UAS.
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Figure 1 1 . UAS Overhaul Process.
5. Supply Process
United Airlines currently conducts supply business with over 200 International
Standardization Organization (ISO) certified vendors, but they are reducing this number.
Each of the heavy maintenance facilities maintains an inventory of high use items. This
inventory is available to all sites and can be easily transferred back and forth using
scheduled flights. The forecasting/demand goal is to maintain a 60-day supply on hand at
all times.
Every 1 1 mechanics has a lead mechanic who processes discrepancies and orders
parts in the system. If a part is not available in the facility, it is electronically passed to
another high maintenance facility. If the part is not available there, it can either be
repaired in a back shop or requisitioned from a supplier. The lead mechanic can either go
through purchasing for the part, or deal directly with the vendor. Previously, purchases
required signatures from lead mechanics, division heads and purchasing. However, the
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approval process lasted close to 30 days and purchases were virtually always approved.













Figure 12. UAS requisition Flow.
Because delays in supply are so costly, forecasting inventory requirements is
critical. Inventory forecasting begins with corporate's estimate of flying hours. Using
failure rates and cycle times, the number of repairs is estimated. The Material
Management Division then takes these scrap rates (rates are updated annually), which are
translated into the shop's demand for supply. A safety stock is then added and annual line
maintenance demand for supply is added. This establishes the quota:
Quota = DT + SS + MSA
DT = (Daily demand) x (Cycle time)
SS = safety Stock = VDT
MSA = Max Station Assignment = Line Demand
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Once a quota is established, it is published in the master inventory record and
used in the economic order quantity model. If a quota is too low, supply will experience
expedites; if it is too high, supply will build inventory. The quota can be subsequently
adjusted to balance these fluctuations.
B. DATA COLLECTION/ANALYSIS
UAS has very few backorders, because supply delays translate immediately into
lost profit. UAS stocks 95% of their required inventory in their location stock rooms.
Using a pre-draw list, they automatically draw parts a month before an expected visit.
Only 3% of the required items are not immediately available during this pre-draw period,
and they are drawn from other sites or purchased directly from suppliers. Additionally,
UAS aggressively manages their suppliers by imposing heavy monetary penalties for
delays in meeting requirements. UAS spends approximately $1.5 billion in spare parts
and $1 billion in spare engines annually. If a trend in inventory deficiency appears, it is
immediately adjusted.
UAS has experienced supply difficulties in two scenarios. The first scenario was
related to aging aircraft. This involved the DC- 10 aircraft, which is being phased out of
their inventory. UAS purchased an additional aircraft and dealt with junk dealers to
acquire parts no longer manufactured.
The second scenario involves their newest acquisitions, the B777 and the A320,
which are both still in production. They have experienced unanticipated repair
requirements in these aircraft that have no parts support. As a result, UAS has
cannibalized parts from the aircraft manufacturing assembly lines. The latest example in
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this category involved a recent collision between a piece of support equipment and the
engine intake of a B777 prior to its first ETOP flight. Post production support planning
would have minimized the impact of these premature repair requirements.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OBJECTIVE
After observing NADEPs, ALCs and UAS, and researching the respective
policies, procedures and backorder status, we are able to address the objective questions
posed in PBD-405: is SMA a good indicator of NADEP supply support; do NADEP's
have poor supply support; and how does it impact production? In general, each depot
operated on the same basic foundation; however, each depot system implemented
different strategies to minimize these similar difficulties. These different strategies
provided proven solutions of similar difficulties in NADEPs and confirmed industry
trends in overhaul maintenance.
B. CONCLUSIONS
• Using SMA to assess supply effectiveness in terms of readiness is
inappropriate.
Although measurement tools are merely indicators for further research,
they do provide guidance to a more specific research path. We found that
using SMA to assess the impact supply effectiveness has on readiness will
lead to an inconclusive path, possibly promoting erroneous decision-
making and exacerbating the difficulties. This formula does not consider
all supply sources, and it considers all requisitions as equal. When
assessing readiness, all requisitions are not equal, and we are concerned
with critical parts that directly affect readiness (EPG 1 and 2). The SMA
formula currently used is appropriate for assessing Navy inventory stock
levels.
• Out of the three depot systems we observed, NADEPs experienced the
most backorders affecting production.
Although allowances for line items in the supply system appeared to be
adequate, the actual stock on hand and the respective estimated delivery
dates were detrimental to production. The Navy's backlog approached two
to three years, compared to the less than two-year window for the Air
Force, and the zero tolerance lead-time for UAS.
59
There were five main common themes that surfaced for the readiness
degraders': excessive delivery times in both the Navy and Air Force,
unpredictability in forecasting, sole source contracting, a diminishing
defense industrial base, and a lack of management of contractors.
Multiple configurations in the Navy's and the Air Force's inventory
are very difficult and costly to maintain and directly contribute to
unpredictability.
Multiple configurations demand multiple aircraft specifications and
additional resources in test equipment, training, manpower and inventory.
Sole source contracting and a diminishing Defense Industrial Base
directly contribute to a poor supply posture.
The most severe NADEP lead times involved defaulted sole source
contracts, leaving the Navy with no recourse. This lack of recourse is also
due to a diminishing defense industrial base. There are several reasons for
supplier's lack of participation in government contracts.
Although the defense acquisition process has moved away from a military
specification (MILSPEC) environment to increase flexibility in the
commercial contractor base, there are still many federal acquisition
controls that deter government business. For example, cost accounting
standards require companies to maintain two accounting systems to
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP) and
government standards. The Department of Defense (DoD) is addressing
low profits by using best business practices and using more commercial
off the shelf acquisitions, but the fact remains that when the economy is
doing well, the profit margins are more attractive in the commercial
industry.
Aging systems contribute to a diminishing Defense Industrial Base.
In all depot systems, aging systems caused severe backlogs of required
parts. The Navy's S-3 and E-2 aircraft, the Air Force's A-10 and UAS'
DC- 10 are all examples of aircraft extended beyond their expected life.
The Air Force and Navy still maintain these models in their inventory and
are experiencing excessive cycle times. UAS remedied their situation by
purchasing spare aircraft for parts and eventually replaced the model.
AH readiness degraders in our study revealed a lack of aggressiveness
in contracting and item managers.
Several backorder cases involved parts of which item managers were
unaware or had limited time to review and take action. In all cases, this
lack of attention was attributed to an overwhelming workload, resulting
from BRAC, downsizing and ALC/NADEP consolidation. These events
increased contract requirements and decreased the manpower to
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administer them. The readiness degrader data appeared to support these
statements.
In many such cases, there was zero stock on hand, and contracts were just
beginning the first article test phase. This indicates that quantities on hand
fell well below the reorder point before item managers discovered a lapse
in the contract or the lack of suppliers with which to initiate contracts. A
few of the back orders involved suppliers waiting for a contract to be
issued. The side effects inadequate contract management are extremely
crippling for an indefinite period, including loss of suppliers in the defense
industrial base, and lack of components and respective operating assets.
These are all phenomena the Navy is currently experiencing.
The contracting process is causing delays affecting production.
The Air Force's and UAS' emphasis on a responsive logistics pipeline
is extremely beneficial.
While the Air Force's move from three to two maintenance levels is
debatable, there is no question that the associated emphasis on a
responsive logistics pipeline is extremely beneficial. With the advent of
the Internet and e-commerce in the commercial world, the logistics
pipeline responsiveness has become the focal point for improving
profitability. These commercial applications have significantly improved
in technology and speed, and they have phenomenal implications for
improving the Navy's readiness.
Commercial industry's drive towards profitability has encouraged
streamlining current processes and developing new methods of
improving efficiency and effectiveness.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Use SMA ipgi&2 formula as a tool to indicate supply readiness posture.
The SMA ipgi&2 formula is a more focused measurement tool that
narrows-in on readiness critical parts. This provides a more defined
indication of supply health in terms of readiness.
Eliminate the remaining ASPA programs and assign tail numbers to
NADEP schedule ahead of time.
Unpredictability cannot be eliminated, but it can be minimized by
minimizing unpredictability in the respective sources. One of these
sources is the aircraft scheduling and assignment process. The Air Force
and UAS capitalize on a more predictable scheduling process by obtaining
a profile of expected aircraft. They use a rigid, no exceptions schedule that
assigns specific tail numbers to overhaul dates. This allows depots to pre-
stage resources and plan a critical path minimizing cycle time and
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allowing the asset to return to the fleet quickly. Although the Navy is
using EMC to move closer to such a model, the ASPA program still
pertains to many platforms and tail numbers are not pre-assigned. We
observed the impact of these differences directly at Hill ALC by
comparing the C-130 program for the Navy and Air Force aircraft.
Pursue standardization of Weapons Systems where possible and
specifically focus future acquisition on multi force standardization.
UAS as well as the rest of commercial industry observed the costs of
multiple configurations. This led them to standardize aircraft
configurations through "family of aircraft." This saves time and money in
overhaul processes, test equipment, training and inventory. This provides a
consistent environment where resource requirements become
standardized, and hence more predictable. Additionally, this frees
resources through an exponential learning curve, minimizes cycle time and
centralizes inventories of spare parts, tools, test equipment, manpower and
facilities. Standardization also provides incentives for suppliers to
continue producing spare parts and capture economies of scale.
Pursue long-term multi-vendor contracts to provide multiple avenues
in case of default and encourage more suppliers to remain in the
defense industrial base.
Identify factors deterring companies from remaining in the defense
industrial base and develop preventive measures.
Review all post production support plans to ensure robust plans exists
for potential aging systems.
As a safeguard to a diminishing defense industrial base, it is imperative
that post production support plans are robust enough to address aging
aircraft problems.
Although replacing aircraft earlier in their life cycle could minimize this
problem, a robust post production support program is still critical. We
observed this importance in the UAS B777 and A320, new aircraft still in
production. Even though United Airlines routinely replaces their aircraft
earlier in their life cycle, a good post production support plan would have
eliminated some of the support difficulties they encountered with current
models that are not yet aged.
Review contract specialist and item manager staffing to determine if
workload is balanced or an increase in staff is required.
The data we collected did not definitively support a requirement for
additional manpower; however, this information is well enough
substantiated to study workload and manpower and identify any trends
across item managers in excessive workloads and inadequate attention to
inventory levels. UAS did not show any signs of delay in contracting
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because they take a long-term multi-vendor approach aggressively
managing suppliers with heavy monetary penalties.
Place supply personnel or material managers under the reporting
cognizance of the production "fixers."
If fixers write supply evaluations, the measure of performance of supply is
directly related to production and subsequently readiness. Often times,
when this relationship does not occur, supply personnel create
performance objectives related to inventory efficiency or cost savings
alone. Although these personal performance concepts of inventory
efficiency and cost savings are beneficial to a depot, they mean little if
they cause excessive lead times to production that can prove to be even
more costly.
Continue to discover says to streamline this contracting process to
enable rapid response to emerging needs.
Conduct a study on current logistics concepts for application to DoD
logistics.
Incorporate a "readiness equals profit" mentality in DoD business
planning
Although DoD is a government agency that cannot pursue monetary
profit, we can experience the same benefits by equating profit to
readiness. The improvements the commercial industry seeks to improve
profit are the same improvements that will improve readiness. Although
readiness is difficult to measure, it is the profit that we must use as a
driving concept. Readiness equals profit.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Complete a workload efficiency review of item manager and contracting
specialist positions
Evaluate the effectiveness of Post Production Support Planning
Identify and analyze the Defense Industrial Base
Analyze the costs and benefits of multi-force weapon system
standardization
Study the value added in the Contracting Process
Analyze the Costs and Benefits of outsourcing contract management
functions
Analyze the Cost Benefits of maintaining aged aircraft systems compared
to procuring new aircraft systems
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Identify and analyze readiness measurement tools
Assess the effectiveness of a two versus three level maintenance system
Examine the benefits of a rigid depot scheduling system
Analyze the effects of aging systems on maintenance manhours
Assess the effects of aging systems on supply requirements
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